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Abstract
Government support of private (occupational and personal) pensions
through the system of tax reliefs is large: between one quarter and one
third that of direct support of state pensions through public expenditure.
However, it is regressive, lacks transparency and is difficult to control. This
paper argues that it should be replaced by a cost-neutral matching grant or
tax-credit scheme. Such a scheme would embody the ‘partnership’ idea
implicit in much government policy in this area, but would be much more
progressive, more open, and more accountable than existing arrangements.
The argument is illustrated by statistical comparisons of the distributional
impact of the present system and three alternative versions of the tax-credit
scheme. An appendix discusses the methodology for calculating the cost
of pension tax reliefs over time.
1“No-one ever got rich by passing up golden opportunities and that’s
exactly what a personal pension offers you. Why? Because one of the
beauties of saving for your retirement is that the government actually
gives you money - and lots of it - to encourage you... you get back every
penny of the income tax you pay on the money you invest.” Small print:
“the value of the tax benefit depends on how much tax you pay” Virgin
advertisement, The Guardian, 17th September 1997.
Introduction
There are currently two ways in which the Government supports the
provision of old age pensions in Britain. One involves direct public
expenditure on state-provided pensions; the other ‘indirect’ expenditure
through tax relief on private (occupational and personal) pensions. The
first includes the basic state pension and the state earnings-related pension
scheme (SERPS); their costs amounted to £32.5 billion in 1996/7. The
second involves a variety of different kinds of tax relief; as we shall see, the
costs of these reliefs are a matter of controversy, but we estimate their net
cost at approximately £9 billion.
Thus the indirect form of pension support - part of what Titmuss
(1968) called ‘fiscal’ welfare – is already quite large in comparison to direct
support. As more people join occupational, personal or the proposed
‘stakeholder’ pension schemes, it is likely to increase yet further in
significance. This raises a set of important policy questions. Should the
government help private pension provision in this fashion? Is the structure
of tax relief the best method of achieving the aims of policy in the area? Or
are there other policy instruments that could do the job better? It is to these
questions that this paper is addressed.
Now government assistance for private pensions can be justified as
a method of encouraging individuals to make their own provision for their
old age, thereby reducing pressure for increased direct expenditure on the
state pension scheme1. More generally, such assistance can be seen as part
of a ‘partnership’ approach towards the provision of welfare: one where
the state goes into voluntary partnership with individuals, instead of either
discouraging their own efforts through direct provision, or coercing them
through compulsory savings or other mechanisms. Thus direct spending
                        
1. There is a broader issue as to the justification for any kind of government
intervention in pension provision, direct or indirect. We do not have the space to deal
with this here; see Le Grand (1995) for a discussion.
2on universal pensions, as in the UK and most European countries, acts as
a positive disincentive for personal savings; a disincentive effect that is
further complicated if the pension is not universal but income and asset-
tested, as in Australia2. And compulsory private pension schemes, of the
kind favoured in Singapore or Chile, involve coercion, with a negative
impact on individual motivation and sense of self-reliance. In contrast,
partnership schemes can be seen as mobilising individual self-interest in
a positive direction (as advocated, for instance, by Field, 1995), while at the
same time fulfilling the more altruistic purposes of collective welfare. As
one of the authors has put it elsewhere, they appeal to both the ‘knight’ and
the ‘knave’ in human beings (Le Grand 1997).
In that tax relief on pensions is a form of government aid that
accompanies individuals’ personal contributions, it is a type of partnership
scheme. However, it is a highly unsatisfactory one. It is only open to those
who pay taxes; partly because of this, and partly because of the existence
of increasing marginal tax rates with income, it is highly regressive. It is not
transparent; that is, it appears in the form of tax not being paid, and the
people who receive it may well be unaware that there has been a reduction
in their tax bill because of it. Moreover, even those who are aware of the
tax reduction may not see it as a form of welfare assistance; rather, they
may see it as simply the government taxing ‘their’ money less and hence
as involving a reduction in governmental malevolence rather than being an
example of state beneficence. It is inflexible, with the amount of aid
provided being determined by parameters for the tax system such as the
structure of marginal tax rates, themselves determined by factors unrelated
to the particular programme for which the relief is being offered. It is
difficult to control, as, unlike public expenditure programmes, tax reliefs
are not subject to the annual Treasury spending round or any systematic
analysis of value-for-money. And it undermines democratic oversight of
the government’s tax and spending priorities by departmental select
committees and the like, leading to an excessive policy concern with the
costs of direct public spending to the relative neglect of tax spending (Kvist
and Sinfield 1996).
In what follows we expand some of these arguments against pension
tax relief, and consider possible alternatives. More specifically, the next
section describes the current system of relief; followed by an examination
of its regressivity. The following section considers ways in which the
                        
2. Universal, non-means tested, pensions have a negative income effect on both
work effort and savings; means-tested pensions have both a negative income effect and
a negative substitution effect.
3system could be modified or replaced altogether. It examines in some detail
three versions of a matching grant or tax-credit scheme that, it is argued,
could achieve the aims of policy far more effectively than the existing
system without costing any more. There are three appendices: one
providing the main tables on which the analysis in the main text is based,
one discussing methods of estimating the cost of the various reliefs, and
one providing some further distributional analyses of the proposed
schemes.
The Current System of Tax Relief
Pension provision is subsidised through the tax system in three main ways.
First, individuals can claim back any tax they have paid on money that has
been put into their pension fund by either themselves or their employers.
Second, pension funds get tax relief on their investment income. These tax
reliefs are offset by the taxation of pensions when they are paid out;
however, as is demonstrated in Appendix 2, this offset is only partial.
Third, the lump sum component of any pension payment is tax free.
These entitlements are not unlimited. In particular, it is not possible
to contribute unlimited amounts of income to a pension scheme tax free.
While all contributions by employers to occupational schemes are tax free,
in that they are deducted as a business expense from employers’
corporation tax liability and do not count as a taxable benefit-in-kind for
employees, there is an annual ceiling on the amount that employees may
contribute tax free. This ceiling varies between occupational and personal
pension schemes. Tax-free employee contributions to occupational schemes
may not exceed 15% of earnings while more generous limits, varying with
age, apply to personal pensions (up to age 35 tax-free contributions are
limited to 17.5% of salary, but this rises to 40% for the over 60s). In
addition, an ‘earnings cap’ of £84,000 is applied to both types of scheme:
that is, the earnings figure to which the relevant contribution percentage
is applied cannot exceed £84,000, thus setting an overall limit on the
amount which can be contributed tax free. In consequence, the absolute
amount which someone may contribute tax free to a pension varies with
the type of scheme of which they are a member, their income and, if they
are in a personal pension, their age. For instance, a member of an
occupational scheme earning £10,000 a year may make tax-free pension
contributions, on top of any contributions from their employer, of up to
£1,500 a year; one earning £100,000 a year could contribute £12,600 (15% of
4£84,000) tax free. In comparison, a 61-year-old member of a personal
pension earning £10,000 may contribute tax free up to £4,000; one earning
£100,000 could contribute tax free up to £33,600 (40% of £84,000).
There are also new restrictions on the tax-free status of pension fund
investment income. In July 1997 it was announced that Advanced
Corporation Tax credits were to be withdrawn. This has the implication
that, while capital gains remain tax free, dividend income accruing to
pension funds is now partially taxed. The precise effect of this change will
depend on how pension fund managers adjust their investment strategies,
and it is not yet clear how much additional tax will in fact be paid under
the new regime.
Finally, the lump sum component of the final pension is limited to
25% of the pension fund in a personal pension or one and a half times final
salary in a defined benefit occupational pension (subject again to an
earnings cap of £84,000). The remaining part of the final pension, paid as
an annuity, is then subject to income tax.
Despite these restrictions, the reliefs offer individuals saving through
pension schemes considerable advantages. For instance, compare their tax
situation with those who save through investing their own money in, say,
a building society. The latter would have to find their savings out of
income that has already been taxed; unlike pension savers, they would not
be able to set their contributions against their tax liabilities. Further, any
interest they earn on the savings will be taxed at 20% (or 40% if they are a
higher rate taxpayer); whereas, until last year, the interest or dividend
payments earned by those saving through pension schemes would have
been tax free. Moreover, even under the new arrangements, pension funds
can still avoid tax by switching their investments into ones that offer capital
gains instead of dividend payments.
The only advantage to non-pension savers would be that, unlike
pensioners, they would not be taxed when they came to withdraw their
savings; however, even that advantage is reduced by the fact that a large
part of most pension payments (the lump-sum) is tax free. Also, incomes
in retirement are generally lower than during working lives, while tax
allowances in retirement are higher. The result is that the amount of tax to
which people are liable on their pension benefits is generally lower than
the tax they would have paid had their pension contributions been subject
to tax.
From the point of view of savings-neutrality, this apparent
privileging of private pensions for tax purposes can be partly justified on
5the grounds that pension savings are illiquid, and therefore a much less
flexible form of saving than the alternatives. This illiquidity means that, if
saving through private pension schemes is to be encouraged, some form
of government incentive is desirable. However, the need for this incentive
does not necessarily imply that the present system is the only, or even the
best, way to do it. It is part of the contention of this paper that there are
other ways that can be found which will better meet the aim of assisting
private pensions, while at the same time furthering other social aims that
the government might have.
Perhaps the most significant criticism of the system concerns its
regressivity. Estimates of this are not easy to obtain. Data limitations
prevent us obtaining any estimate of the distributional effect of tax relief on
lump-sum payments; and it is difficult (and of limited usefulness) to
estimate the distributional effect of tax relief on investment income,
because, at least for defined benefit schemes, it is not possible to allocate
the assets of pension funds to their members, and because, for investment
income, the tax changes of July 1997 mean that any estimates based on
previous years are of only limited relevance to the current situation.
However, the distributional impact of contribution relief is easier to
investigate. This is illustrated in Figure 1, based on Table A1 in Appendix
1. The figure is derived from Inland Revenue statistics and shows the
distribution of relief on both occupational and personal pensions by
income group of taxpayers in 1996/73. Employers’ contributions are
grossed up from employees’ contributions so that the total cost of
contribution tax relief equals £9.3 billion (see Appendix 2). They illustrate
a strongly regressive pattern, with, for instance, those on incomes over
£100,000 receiving an amount equivalent to 3.3% of their income, compared
with 0.5% for those on incomes between £3,500 and £4,000. Overall, half the
benefit of tax relief on pension contributions goes to people with incomes
over £25,000 (the top 10% of taxpayers), and a quarter to people with
incomes over £45,000 (the top 2.5% of taxpayers). As Appendix 2 sets out
in detail, these figures may in fact be representative of all pension tax
reliefs rather than just contribution relief, as the additional cost of
                        
3. We have also constructed similar estimates using the Family Expenditure Survey
based simulation model POLIMOD constructed by the micro-simulation unit at
Cambridge (see Redmond, Sutherland and Wilson, 1996 for a description of the model).
For occupational pensions the model revealed a very similar pattern to that derived
from Inland Revenue statistics. However, a limitation of the model is that personal
pensions could not be included, and, given the importance of the latter, it seemed
preferable to concentrate here on the Inland Revenue estimates.
6investment income relief is cancelled out by the revenue accruing from tax
paid on pensions in payment.
Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
There are two reasons for the regressivity of pension tax reliefs. First,
the propensity for people to be in a private pension scheme increases with
their income, so that 80% of people with an income of £25,000 or more are
in a private pension scheme compared to only 30% of people with an
income of £7,000. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The figure also shows that
there is a difference between personal and occupational schemes, with
membership of occupational schemes rising steadily as incomes increase
to £25,000, then declining thereafter, while membership of personal
pensions is flat between £12,500 and £25,000, before climbing for the very
well off.
Figure 1: Value of pension contribution tax relief (%  of 
taxpayer group income)
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7Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
The second reason for the regressivity of tax reliefs is the fact that
people can claim back tax at their marginal rate, so that the absolute
amount of tax relief which someone gets rises with their income (see Figure
3). Moreover, higher rate taxpayers receive proportionately more tax relief
than basic rate taxpayers, reflecting the higher marginal rate at which they
pay tax.
The distributional effect of the current system of tax relief on pension
contributions can also be expressed in the form of a Gini coefficient, where
0 represents complete equality and 100 represents complete inequality.
Using Inland Revenue data we have calculated that the effect of the tax
system is to reduce the Gini coefficient for the 25.8 million people who pay
Figure 2: Percentage of taxpayers contributing to 
a private pension scheme
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8tax from 38.24 to 34.274. However, the inequality reducing effect of the tax
system would be even greater without tax relief on pension contributions,
with the Gini coefficient on the income of all taxpayers falling to 33.52
when such reliefs are removed.
Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
Proposals for Reform
We have seen that the present system has a number of undesirable
features. These include its lack of transparency for pension contributors; its
‘invisibility’ in the public accounts; and its regressivity. There are a number
of ways in which it could be reformed. First, its regressivity could be
reduced by changing some of the parameters of the system. For instance,
as has been suggested by many commentators, tax relief could be confined
to the basic rate. Although this would indeed lessen the regressivity of the
                        
4. All Gini co-efficients are calculated using the computer program INEQ devised
by Prof. Frank Cowell at the LSE.
Figure 3: Average per capita pension 
contribution, including tax relief (£ pa)
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000
35
25
45
00
55
00
70
00
90
00
11
00
0
13
00
0
15
00
0
17
00
0
19
00
0
22
00
0
26
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
Annual income
own contribution tax contribution
9system, it would not change the position of those who do not pay tax or
who pay tax at less than the basic rate; hence its impact would be limited.
Nor would it do anything to increase the transparency of the system;
indeed, if anything, it would increase its complexity, especially for those
unfamiliar with the language of tax accountancy. The system would still
escape the controls and democratic oversight applied to direct expenditure.
Finally, any such proposal on its own would reduce the amount of
government aid being offered to private pensions: that is, it would not be
revenue or expenditure neutral.
A more technical argument can also be made against limiting relief
to the basic rate. At the moment individuals immediately pre-retirement
who expect to retire on an income of more than £30,000 are indifferent
between whether they pay money into their pension scheme or keep it in
a building society account: very little interest will accrue in either case and
their total tax rate will remain 40% in both cases, though the timing on
when tax is paid will differ. However, if contribution relief were restricted
to 23% they would find their pension savings being taxed at an effective
rate of 57%, while the tax bill on their building society savings would be
unchanged. For younger people the advantages of not being taxed on the
capital gains of pension funds will probably outweigh this consideration,
but, depending on the level of expected returns from pension saving, it is
likely that anyone within five years of retirement who expects to continue
to be a higher rate taxpayer will cease contributing to their pension fund
altogether. While this raises few problems of vertical equity, such an age-
related effect may be problematic from the point of view of horizontal
equity. Moreover, it might create administrative problems for firms
operating occupational pension schemes, as their better-off older
employees would start to opt-out of company provision as they
approached retirement. Reducing the level of the contribution cap, while
keeping the rate of relief closer to the top rate of tax, would ease this
problem.
A more imaginative solution than limiting tax relief to the basic rate
would be to abolish the system of ‘indirect’ aid through the tax system and
to use the revenue obtained to finance a direct system of aid. More
specifically, one or more of the existing reliefs could be replaced with a
system of matching grants. So, instead of granting tax relief on pension
contributions, the government could offer to match individuals’
contributions with a direct grant. The matching rate could be £ for £; that
is, for each pound contributed by the individual the state would also
10
contribute a pound. Or, if that were considered too generous, the matching
rate could be less: two-thirds, or one half, for instance. As with the present
system there would be a cap on the amount of contribution that could
attract such assistance.
The administration of a matching grant could in fact be integrated
with the tax system, in which case it might be appropriate to refer to the
grant as a ‘tax-credit’. The experience of the Inland Revenue in dealing
with the complexities of the tax relief system suggests the new scheme
would raise few practical difficulties, and the Revenue would be the
obvious administrative agency. Moreover, keeping responsibility for state
support for private pensions with the Inland Revenue would help maintain
the administrative simplicity of occupational schemes, where employers
effectively distribute state support on behalf of the Revenue. The key
difference with a tax relief system would be that, with tax-credits, the
amount of support depends solely on the amount of pension contribution,
and is blind to the amount of tax an individual pays.
However, unlike a matching grant system, tax-credits would not
extend state support for private pension contributions to non-taxpayers.
Under a tax-credit system additional support only goes to those who are
currently contributing to a private pension; while under a matching grant
system support is spread more widely.
A matching grant or tax-credit would have several advantages over
the present system. It would be transparent: government aid would not be
buried in the complexity of the tax system and individuals would see that
they were being helped directly. As an item of direct government
expenditure, or as an annual change in the level of the tax-credit, it would
be subject to systematic parliamentary scrutiny. Under a matching grant
system the aid would be available to everyone, not only to those who pay
tax; and under both systems the amount of aid would not vary with the tax
rate. Hence it would be considerably more progressive (or less regressive)
than the present system.
To illustrate how the scheme might work in practice, we now
consider three versions of it in more detail. Each assumes that tax relief on
pension contributions is abolished with consequent savings of £9.3 billion
(see Appendix 2 for details as to how this figure is obtained). Version A
uses this revenue to fund a matching grant scheme with the matching rate
set at 50p per pound; Version B has a matching rate of 66p; and Version C
£ for £. In each case there is a limit on the amount of contributions that
attract this aid, the limit being set at a level such that the total aid given
11
does not exceed £9.3 billion. The three proposals are thus cost neutral, as
compared with the present system. While there may be some variations
over time the proposals should also be cost neutral in the long run, as
reductions in tax revenue from pensions in payment should be offset by the
decreasing cost of investment income relief (see Appendix 2 for a fuller
discussion of this point).
Illustrations based on Inland Revenue data are given below for the
tax-credit scheme, where all winners and losers are assumed to come from
within the 13.3 million people who already contribute to a private pension
scheme5. Analyses of a full matching grant scheme (that is, one where aid
is available to taxpayers and non-taxpayers alike) were also undertaken,
using the microsimulation model POLIMOD. Unfortunately these are of
limited interest as POLIMOD does not contain data on contributors to
personal pensions. Hence these estimates are confined to an Appendix (3).
Figures 4, 5 and 6 and Tables 1, 2 and 3 below, and Tables A1, A2, A3
and A4 in Appendix 1, show some of the distributional consequences of
alternative versions of the tax-credit scheme, using Inland Revenue data.
With one exception, they are constructed on the assumption that there are
no behavioural consequences of the proposed changes: that is, pension
contributions and original income levels remain unchanged, regardless of
the system of government aid offered. This is obviously unrealistic, but the
present state of the art for these kinds of calculations offers little
opportunity to explore different assumptions about how savings behaviour
may alter. The exception concerns pension contributions above the
contribution limit for aid; it is assumed that these drop to zero in each case,
since, given the illiquidity of pensions, it would be irrational for
individuals to continue to save in this form.
                        
5. This is a slight under-estimate of the number of people in private pensions, as
the Inland Revenue data does not include information on the million or so people in
non-contributory occupational schemes.
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Table 1 shows the effect of alternative versions of the tax-credit
scheme on a range of illustrative individuals, all of whom make the
average pension contribution for someone on their earnings. For
comparison purposes how such individuals fare under the current tax relief
system is also shown. As can be seen, the absolute amount of government
support received by the three lowest earning individuals increases
substantially under all three versions of the scheme. The highest earner
loses under all three versions, while the individual on £25,000 gains under
Versions A and B but loses under Version C.
Turning to the real world, we have estimated the effect of
alternative versions of the tax-credit scheme on all taxpayers rather than
simply on illustrative individuals. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show, for different
income groups, the percentage of post-tax income provided by government
aid under the three versions of the scheme. They can be compared with
Figure 1. It is immediately apparent that they perform much better than the
current system. For instance, under version A those earning between £3,500
and £4,000 receive 1% of their income as a tax-credit, compared with 0.4%
for those earning over £100,000; the comparable figures are 1.3% and 0.3%
for Version B, and 2% and 0.3% for Version C. Indeed the schemes actually
become progressive over wide ranges of the income distribution: over
£22,000 for version A, over £13,000 for Version B and over £11,000 for
Version C.
Table 1: Effect of a tax-credit scheme on five illustrative individuals
Earnings
£ pa
Individual
pension
contribution
£ pa
Tax relief or tax-
credit pension
contribution
£ pa
Tax relief or tax-
credit as a % of
total pension
contribution
Tax relief or
tax-credit as a
% of earnings
Current system
4250 550 51 8% 1%
6500 800 200 20% 3%
12500 1180 350 23% 3%
25000 2400 720 23% 3%
65000 5300 3550 40% 5%
Version A: 50p per £
4250 550 275 33% 6%
6500 800 400 33% 6%
12500 1180 590 33% 5%
25000 1792 896 33% 4%
65000 1792 896 33% 1%
Version B: 66p per £
13
4250 550 367 40% 9%
6500 800 533 40% 8%
12500 1103 735 40% 6%
25000 1103 735 40% 3%
65000 1103 735 40% 1%
Version C: £ per £
4250 550 550 50% 13%
6500 705 705 50% 11%
12500 705 705 50% 6%
25000 705 705 50% 3%
65000 705 705 50% 1%
Source: see text.
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Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
Figure 5: Version B: 66p per £ (value of tax-credit 
as % of taxpayer group income)
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Figure 4: Version A: 50p per £ (value of tax-credit as % of 
group income)
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Source: Inland Revenue (1997, Table 3.8, and unpublished)
Figures 4, 5 and 6 are based on Tables A2, A3 and A4 in Appendix 1.
The latter also show the gainers and losers from each of the schemes as
compared with the current scheme. For version A on average only those
earning more than £30,000 lose out; for version B, the losers begin at
£26,000; for version C at £24,000.
The tables in Appendix 1 also show how the benefits of the scheme
are spread out among pension contributors. Under Version A of the
scheme people with incomes over £25,000 (the top 10% of taxpayers)
receive a quarter of the benefit, half the amount they receive under the
current tax relief system, and people with incomes over £45,000 (the top
2.5% of taxpayers) get 5% of the benefit, a fifth of the amount they currently
receive. The equivalent figures for versions B and C are 18.5% and 17.5%
respectively for people with incomes over £25,000; 3.5% of the benefit from
both versions of the scheme go to those with incomes over £45,000.
Figure 6: Version C: £ per £ (value of tax-credit as % 
of taxpayer group income)
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Table 2 displays the results in a different way. It uses changes in Gini
coefficients to show the differences in inequality in the actual aid received by
pension contributors under the three versions of the scheme. It is apparent
that all three versions dramatically reduce inequality in aid received, as
compared with the present system. The reduction increases with the size
of the ‘match’, with the £ for £ system virtually eliminating it entirely.
Table 2: Inequality in Aid Received by Private Pension Contributors
Scheme Gini coefficient
Current system 45.43
Version A (50p for £) 14.70
Version B (66p for £) 4.03
Version C (£ for £) 0.47
Source: see text
Table 3 shows Gini coefficients for the inequality in post-tax income for
all taxpayers for five distributions: without contribution tax relief, with
contribution tax relief (the current system) and under the three tax-credit
schemes. Not surprisingly, the differences are not large; £9.3 billion (the
amount available for distribution) is small when compared with an
aggregate for post-tax incomes of £350 billion. But what is of more interest
is the direction of change. Tax relief on pension contributions actually
increases inequality in post-tax incomes. In contrast, the two higher tax-
credit schemes reduce it; while the lowest matching scheme increases
inequality, but by significantly less than the current system.
Table 3: Government Aid to Private Pensions and Inequality in Post-
Tax Income (all taxpayers)
Scheme Gini coefficient
Without tax relief 33.52
Current system (with tax relief) 34.27
Version A (50p for £) 33.64
Version B (66p for £) 33.39
Version C (£ for £) 33.31
Source: see text
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Conclusion
The present system of aid for private pensions is regressive, opaque,
inflexible, and not readily susceptible to Treasury or Parliamentary
scrutiny. The same resources could be used to fund a tax-credit or
matching grant scheme that would, by definition, cost no more but would
be superior in all these respects. It would be much less regressive; indeed,
depending on the matching rate, it could actually be progressive over wide
ranges of the income distribution. It would be much more transparent to
its beneficiaries. It would set its own parameters, instead of their being set
by the tax system; it would therefore be more flexible. And it would be
much more amenable to expenditure scrutiny.
Perhaps the only disadvantage of the proposal is one of perception:
switching from tax reliefs to matching grants could be seen as a way of
both raising taxes and government expenditure, and this might create
political difficulties. However, since the actual impact on the government’s
fiscal position would be neutral, this would be simply a labelling problem;
and perhaps the tax-credit phraseology would help if there are asymmetric
constraints on tax and public expenditures. Overall, it would be a pity if an
idea was evaluated simply on terminology, and not on its real merits.
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Appendix 1: Main Tables
Table A1: The Distribution of Tax Relief by Income Group
Table A2: The Distribution of Tax-credit by Income Group: Version A
Table A3: The Distribution of Tax-credit by Income Group: Version B
Table A4: The Distribution of Tax-credit by Income Group: Version C
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Table A1: Distribution of pension contribution tax relief by income group
Lower
bound
of income
band
£ pa
Average
income
£ pa
Number of
people
claming tax
relief
000s
Number of
taxpayers
000s
Cumulative
people in
income band
as % of all
taxpayers
Average
contribution
pre-relief
£ pa
Avg value
of tax relief
per
claimant
£ pa
Total
pension
contribution
£ pa
3525 3775 141 547 2.1% 531 133 664
4000 4240 135 582 4.4% 555 139 694
4500 4731 130 714 7.1% 703 176 878
5000 5244 162 885 10.6% 710 178 888
5500 5747 196 861 13.9% 727 182 909
6000 6470 440 1610 20.1% 797 199 997
7000 7514 455 1730 26.8% 952 238 1190
8000 8466 573 1600 33.0% 1062 317 1379
9000 9489 572 1440 38.6% 1048 313 1361
10000 10531 653 1450 44.2% 1042 311 1353
11000 11475 664 1270 49.1% 1062 317 1379
12000 12490 671 1240 53.9% 1177 351 1528
13000 13449 686 1170 58.5% 1269 379 1648
14000 14457 636 1060 62.6% 1380 412 1792
15000 15476 585 984 66.4% 1377 411 1788
16000 16478 574 862 69.7% 1486 444 1930
17000 17477 513 763 72.7% 1532 458 1990
18000 18477 496 719 75.4% 1670 499 2169
19000 19494 415 605 77.8% 1737 519 2256
20000 20985 931 1200 82.4% 2010 600 2610
22000 22957 748 953 86.1% 2273 679 2952
24000 24917 539 663 88.7% 2408 719 3127
26000 26984 445 558 90.9% 2568 767 3336
28000 28969 329 418 92.5% 2560 765 3325
30000 32246 503 630 94.9% 2370 1580 3950
35000 37234 296 354 96.3% 2833 1889 4722
40000 42358 194 229 97.2% 3185 2124 5309
45000 47344 123 151 97.8% 3765 2510 6275
50000 65402 370 455 99.5% 5329 3553 8882
100000 195778 98 126 100.0% 12514 8342 20856
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Table A2: Distribution of tax-credit by income group (Version A: 50p per £ matching rate)
Lower
bound
of income
band
£ pa
Average
income
£ pa
Number of
people
claming tax
credit
000s
Number of
taxpayers
000s
Cumulative
people in
income band as
% of all
taxpayers
Average
contribution
pre-credit
(adjusted
for ceiling)
£ pa
Avg value
of tax credit
per
claimant
£ pa
Total
pension
contribution
£ pa
Cost of tax
credit for
each income
3525 3775 141 547 2.1% 531 266 797
4000 4240 135 582 4.4% 555 277 832
4500 4731 130 714 7.1% 703 351 1054
5000 5244 162 885 10.6% 710 355 1066
5500 5747 196 861 13.9% 727 364 1091
6000 6470 440 1610 20.1% 797 399 1196
7000 7514 455 1730 26.8% 952 476 1427
8000 8466 573 1600 33.0% 1062 531 1593
9000 9489 572 1440 38.6% 1048 524 1572
10000 10531 653 1450 44.2% 1042 521 1563
11000 11475 664 1270 49.1% 1062 531 1593
12000 12490 671 1240 53.9% 1177 588 1765
13000 13449 686 1170 58.5% 1269 634 1903
14000 14457 636 1060 62.6% 1380 690 2069
15000 15476 585 984 66.4% 1377 688 2065
16000 16478 574 862 69.7% 1486 743 2229
17000 17477 513 763 72.7% 1532 766 2298
18000 18477 496 719 75.4% 1670 835 2505
19000 19494 415 605 77.8% 1737 869 2606
20000 20985 931 1200 82.4% 1792 896 2688
22000 22957 748 953 86.1% 1792 896 2688
24000 24917 539 663 88.7% 1792 896 2688
26000 26984 445 558 90.9% 1792 896 2688
28000 28969 329 418 92.5% 1792 896 2688
30000 32246 503 630 94.9% 1792 896 2688
35000 37234 296 354 96.3% 1792 896 2688
40000 42358 194 229 97.2% 1792 896 2688
45000 47344 123 151 97.8% 1792 896 2688
50000 65402 370 455 99.5% 1792 896 2688
100000 195778 98 126 100.0% 1792 896 2688
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Table A3: Distribution of tax-credit by income group (Version B: 66p per £ matching rate)
Lower
bound
of income
band
£ pa
Average
income
£ pa
Number of
people
claming tax
credit
000s
Number of
taxpayers
000s
Cumulative
people in
income band
as % of all
taxpayers
Average
contribution
pre-credit
(adjusted
for ceiling)
£ pa
Avg value
of tax credit
per claimant
£ pa
Total
pension
contribution
£ pa
each income
3525 3775 141 547 2.1% 531 354 885
4000 4240 135 582 4.4% 555 370 925
4500 4731 130 714 7.1% 703 468 1171
5000 5244 162 885 10.6% 710 474 1184
5500 5747 196 861 13.9% 727 485 1212
6000 6470 440 1610 20.1% 797 531 1329
7000 7514 455 1730 26.8% 952 634 1586
8000 8466 573 1600 33.0% 1062 708 1770
9000 9489 572 1440 38.6% 1048 699 1747
10000 10531 653 1450 44.2% 1042 695 1737
11000 11475 664 1270 49.1% 1062 708 1770
12000 12490 671 1240 53.9% 1103 735 1838
13000 13449 686 1170 58.5% 1103 735 1838
14000 14457 636 1060 62.6% 1103 735 1838
15000 15476 585 984 66.4% 1103 735 1838
16000 16478 574 862 69.7% 1103 735 1838
17000 17477 513 763 72.7% 1103 735 1838
18000 18477 496 719 75.4% 1103 735 1838
19000 19494 415 605 77.8% 1103 735 1838
20000 20985 931 1200 82.4% 1103 735 1838
22000 22957 748 953 86.1% 1103 735 1838
24000 24917 539 663 88.7% 1103 735 1838
26000 26984 445 558 90.9% 1103 735 1838
28000 28969 329 418 92.5% 1103 735 1838
30000 32246 503 630 94.9% 1103 735 1838
35000 37234 296 354 96.3% 1103 735 1838
40000 42358 194 229 97.2% 1103 735 1838
45000 47344 123 151 97.8% 1103 735 1838
50000 65402 370 455 99.5% 1103 735 1838
100000 195778 98 126 100.0% 1103 735 1838
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Table A4: Distribution of tax-credit by income group (Version C: £ for £ matching rate)
Lower
bound
of income
band
£ pa
Average
income
£ pa
Number of
people
claming tax
credit
000s
Number of
taxpayers
000s
Cumulative
people in
income band
as % of all
taxpayers
Average
contribution
pre-credit
(adjusted
for ceiling)
£ pa
Avg value
of tax credit
per claimant
£ pa
Total
pension
contribution
£ pa
3525 3775 141 547 2.1% 531 531 1062
4000 4240 135 582 4.4% 555 555 1110
4500 4731 130 714 7.1% 703 703 1405
5000 5244 162 885 10.6% 705 705 1410
5500 5747 196 861 13.9% 705 705 1410
6000 6470 440 1610 20.1% 705 705 1410
7000 7514 455 1730 26.8% 705 705 1410
8000 8466 573 1600 33.0% 705 705 1410
9000 9489 572 1440 38.6% 705 705 1410
10000 10531 653 1450 44.2% 705 705 1410
11000 11475 664 1270 49.1% 705 705 1410
12000 12490 671 1240 53.9% 705 705 1410
13000 13449 686 1170 58.5% 705 705 1410
14000 14457 636 1060 62.6% 705 705 1410
15000 15476 585 984 66.4% 705 705 1410
16000 16478 574 862 69.7% 705 705 1410
17000 17477 513 763 72.7% 705 705 1410
18000 18477 496 719 75.4% 705 705 1410
19000 19494 415 605 77.8% 705 705 1410
20000 20985 931 1200 82.4% 705 705 1410
22000 22957 748 953 86.1% 705 705 1410
24000 24917 539 663 88.7% 705 705 1410
26000 26984 445 558 90.9% 705 705 1410
28000 28969 329 418 92.5% 705 705 1410
30000 32246 503 630 94.9% 705 705 1410
35000 37234 296 354 96.3% 705 705 1410
40000 42358 194 229 97.2% 705 705 1410
45000 47344 123 151 97.8% 705 705 1410
50000 65402 370 455 99.5% 705 705 1410
100000 195778 98 126 100.0% 705 705 1410
24
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Appendix 2: The Cost of Pension Tax Reliefs
The Inland Revenue (1997, tables 7.10 and 1.6) estimate the gross cost of tax
relief on private pensions schemes to be £17.6bn in 1996/7. This is made up
as following:
Tax relief on contributions to occupational pensions 6 =
£7.0bn
Tax relief on contributions to personal pensions 6 = £2.3bn
Tax relief on investment income of funds = £7.9bn
Tax relief on lump sum payouts (unfunded schemes) = £0.4bn
Total = £17.6bn
As this figure is for 1996/7 it omits the £3.5bn saving on investment
income relief resulting from the withdrawal of Advanced Corporation Tax
(ACT) credits announced in the July Budget7. More importantly, this
estimate does not allow for that part of the money lost through tax relief
which will flow back to the Exchequer in the future through tax payments
once pensions become payable. The Inland Revenue attempt to allow for
this effect by subtracting tax paid on pensions in payment at the moment
(£4.8bn last year), giving an estimate for the net cost of pension tax reliefs
in 1996/7 of £12.8bn. However, the validity of the Inland Revenue’s costing
has been questioned. It is argued by, e. g., Knox (1990) that future tax
receipts on private pension benefits will exceed the amount of tax currently
collected on such benefits, reflecting the fact that tomorrow’s pension
                        
6. From employees and employers. While it would be possible to only change the
system for giving tax relief on employee contributions there is a danger that further
restrictions on the availability of tax relief on employee contributions (particularly for
high earners) would result in employers switching to more tax-efficient remuneration
systems through making their pension schemes non-contributory. It is therefore
assumed in the following that contribution relief is blind to whether contributions come
from employers or employees.
7. Budget press releases. This is probably an upper bound estimate of the revenue
gain from this change as it ignores any alteration in the investment behaviour of
pension funds and the extent to which income is taken in the form of capital gains
(which remain tax exempt) rather than dividends. As this was the expressed intention
of the change it seems reasonable to expect the long run revenue gain from the removal
of ACT credits to be rather lower than £3.5bn.
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payments will be based on the higher levels of contribution being made
today.
Such forward-looking estimates of the level of future tax payments
on pension benefits have been attempted by Knox (1990), Dilnot and
Johnson (1993), and Hills (unpublished). The latter attempts to calculate
future tax payments by estimating the effect of three factors on the amount
of contribution and investment income relief that is eventually returned to
the Exchequer:
i) the ability to take a proportion of one’s pension fund as a tax-free
lump sum reduces pension incomes, so reducing tax liabilities in
retirement;
ii) incomes in retirement are lower than incomes in work, and hence tax
liabilities are lower; and
iii) the existence of investment relief increases the level of pension
benefits, and therefore the amount of tax collected from retirees.
The effect of i) is to reduce the amount of contributions that are taken
in the form of taxable pension benefits by around 15%8. The effect of ii) can
be estimated by assuming that the average rate of tax on pensions in
payment remains constant over time at 17%9. Given that the average rate
of tax on pension contributions is 28%9, this implies that, ignoring the effect
of tax-free lump sums, around 60% of the revenue lost through
contribution relief will eventually be returned to the Exchequer in the form
of tax paid on pension benefits. The effect of iii) can similarly be estimated
by assuming that 17% of the gross cost of investment income relief will
eventually be returned to the Exchequer. Using this methodology we
estimate that the amount of tax collected on pension benefits resulting from
today’s pension contributions will be around £5.8bn10, £1bn more than is
                        
8. The tax-free lump sum is limited to 25% of the pension fund in a personal
pension or 1.5 times final salary in a defined benefit occupational pension. Assuming
someone retires on two-thirds of their final earnings then their maximum lump sum
payment is equivalent to two years’ worth of pension, between 10% and 15% of the
total value of their pension. Given that the majority of people with private pensions are
in defined benefit schemes the average proportion of a pension fund taken as a lump
sum payment is assumed to be 15%.
9. 1996/7 figures. Taken from Inland Revenue (1997) p75.
10. The cost of tax relief on pension contributions was £9.3bn in 96/7. The tax-free
lump sum means 85% of this will be converted into taxable pension benefits, so £4.8bn
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collected on pension benefits paid out today11. This suggests that, including
savings due to the withdrawal of ACT credits, the true net cost of pension
tax reliefs is around £9bn, rather lower than the Inland Revenue’s estimate
of £12.8bn and Knox’s estimate of £12bn, but somewhat higher than Dilnot
and Johnson’s estimate of £4bn.
However, the above calculations ignore a more fundamental point -
that while contributions continue to exceed benefit payouts the cost of
investment income relief is likely to grow, reflecting the fact that the stock
of assets qualifying for relief is increasing. Therefore our £9bn estimate of
the current net cost of pension tax reliefs is unlikely to stay constant over
time. Table A5 shows how the cost of the various pension-related tax reliefs
has grown over the last decade.
Table A5: Cost of tax relief for occupational pensions 1986/7 –
1996/7
Cost in 1986/7 Cost in 1996/7 % growth
Contribution relief 7.9 7.0 -12%
Investment income
relief
6.5 7.9 21%
Tax on pensions in
payment
(4) (4.8) 21%
Total net cost
(IR methodology)
10.5 10.1 -3%
Note: All figures in £bn at 96/7 prices. The cost of investment income relief in 86/7 has
been adjusted upwards to reflect changes in the Inland Revenue’s methodology. The
                                                                            
(60% of £9.3bn*0.85) of contribution relief will eventually flow back to the Exchequer,
as will around £1bn from tax on the higher pensions resulting from investment income
relief.
11. A similar conclusion is also reached by looking at the extent to which private
pension schemes have reached a steady-state position. The fact that contributions to
private pensions are currently around £33bn while pension benefits paid out are
around £28bn (both figures derived from Inland Revenue, 1997) suggests that, as a
whole, private pension schemes are still maturing, and hence future private pension
payments will be greater than today. This reflects two underlying factors. First, though
membership of occupational schemes has been broadly flat for the last 30 years, the
generosity of pension benefits is increasing, as is the stock of pensioners receiving
occupational pension payments. Second, the growth of personal pensions over the last
decade has extended the membership of private pension schemes, so a greater
proportion of retirees will receive private pension payments in the future.
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investment income relief figure for 96/7 includes the cost of relief in respect of funds
held by personal pension schemes (which did not exist in 86/7).
Source: Inland Revenue (1997, table 7.10 and equivalents for earlier years).
Calculations of the net cost of pension tax reliefs which project
forward over time (as Knox and Hills both attempt to do) should therefore
consider the effect of contributions exceeding benefits on the cost of
investment income relief, as well as on the amount of tax collected on
future pension benefits. Though the timing of these two effects may differ,
they are likely to cancel out in the long run as the amount of revenue loss
from investment income relief and the revenue gain from taxing pensions
in payment is roughly equal12. Hence a reasonable approximation of the net
long run cost of pension tax reliefs is simply the £9.3bn cost of contribution
relief.
The effect of proposed changes to pension contribution tax relief
The likely effect of proposed changes to the contribution relief system
would be to reduce the total amount of saving which occurs through
pension funds13. The extent of this effect will vary between the three
                        
12. The similarity between the cost of investment income relief and the revenue gain
from tax on pension benefits is coincidental: prior to the July 1997 Budget investment
income relief exceeded tax collected on pension benefits by around £3bn.
13. This does not imply that the level of economy-wide savings will also fall. The
effect of our proposed changes to pension contribution tax relief on savings behaviour
is difficult to determine, and is likely to vary between the three versions analysed. In
all three versions of the scheme the income and substitution effects for low-earners tend
in opposite directions, and as their relative importance is unknown it is not possible to
determine whether, overall, the scheme will increase or decrease the propensity of low-
earners to save. However, for high- earners, and older low-earners in personal
pensions, we must also take into account the effect of the system of compulsory pension
contributions linked to SERPS. In effect the system for contracting-out from SERPS
obliges all employees in defined benefit occupational schemes to contribute 4.6% of
their salary between the lower and upper earnings limits to their pension scheme, while
for personal pension holders the system of age-related rebates means that between 3.8%
and 9% of their earnings between the lower and upper limit is automatically
contributed to their pension via the system of contracted-out rebates. This means that
employees earning at or above the upper earnings limit (£465 per week, £24,180 per
year) must contribute a minimum of £964 per year to their pension, while older workers
in personal pensions must contribute even more. Given the tax-credit scheme’s
proposed limits on the amount of pension contribution qualifying for tax relief, as set
out in table 1, some better-off employees would have no tax relief allowance left, and
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schemes, with the most generous system (£ for £ matching grant) reducing
the amount contributed to pension funds by £14bn while the least radical
scheme (50p per £ contributed) reduces such saving by £5bn14. This in turn
will cause the level of expected private pension payments, and hence the
expected tax collected on such payments, to fall, increasing the long run net
cost of pension tax reliefs. But the reduced amount of saving in the form of
pensions will also reduce the cost of investment income relief, as the stock
of assets attracting relief gradually declines. Due to the similar costs of
these two elements of the pension tax relief system the long run effect of
revenue-neutral changes to contribution reliefs is likely to be minimal. In
other words, there is no reason to expect the long run cost of the reforms
proposed in the text to differ significantly from their short run cost. Indeed,
should the substitution effect dominate the income effect for low earners,
it is possible that the long run cost of changing contribution reliefs will be
lower than the short run cost, as higher levels of saving may reduce future
expenditure on means-tested benefits.
However, Knox (1990), Dilnot and Johnson (1993) and Hills (1984a
and b) all raise a more fundamental objection to the methodology used
above (and by the Inland Revenue), pointing out that the cost of savings tax
reliefs depends on the range of alternative tax-advantaged savings options
open to people. The costings presented above implicitly assume that the
alternative to saving in the form of a pension is to save through a bank or
building society savings account, where contributions and interest
payments do not attract tax relief. Knox suggests that more likely
investment vehicles for re-directed pension savings are PEPs or TESSAs,
and estimates that if all re-directed saving took this route then the long run
net cost of pension tax reliefs would fall to around £2bn (Dilnot and
Johnson suggest the figure would be even lower).
                                                                            
hence would not be able to make voluntary pension contributions. As such there would
be no additional incentive for such workers to save as the substitution effect will not
exist, while the income effect will still tend to reduce overall saving, at least for those
who do not qualify for higher rate tax relief at the moment. Therefore the effect of the
scheme, particularly Version C, may be to reduce the overall amount saved by people
earning around the upper earnings limit. Ending the system whereby compulsory
pension contributions attract tax relief would eradicate this problem; it would also put
private pension schemes on a level playing field with SERPS, contributions to which
do not attract tax relief.
14. Based on the assumption that no contributions are made above the ceiling for tax
relief. No estimate is made of the likely increase in saving resulting from the improved
incentive for low earners to save in the form of a pension.
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However, this ignores the fact that there are limits on the amount of
money which can be contributed to such saving schemes. In particular, the
government have announced that a £50,000 lifetime limit will apply to their
proposed Individual Savings Accounts, which will replace PEPs and
TESSAs from April 1999. Only those people below the lifetime limit would
be able to transfer assets to this alternative tax-sheltered savings vehicle,
hence the lower estimates produced by Knox and Dilnot and Johnson are
likely to be less pertinent.
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Appendix 3: Distributional effects of a matching grant scheme
A matching grant scheme would extend government support for private
pensions beyond those who currently contribute to such schemes. Analysis
of a matching grant scheme therefore involves investigating a counter-
factual: what would be the take-up of private pensions if the eligibility
constraints on state support were relaxed, and how much would people
contribute if government support were more generous? Clearly there can
be no robust answers to these questions, though it might be possible to
investigate how savings behaviour varies across different households and
use this to derive assumptions about how people will react to the new
scheme. We have not attempted such an exercise. Instead we make the
strongest possible assumption: that everyone who is eligible for a matching
grant contributes to a private pension, and that everyone contributes up to
the permitted ceiling.
Table A6 sets out the amount of matching grant, and therefore the
maximum possible pension contribution (before grant), for the three
variants discussed in relation to the tax-credit scheme. Eligibility for the
matching grant is also varied, with one basis bringing the entire adult
population into the scheme, another restricting eligibility to employees,
carers and the unemployed, and another that limits availability to
employees only. This last option mimics the effect of abolishing SERPS, in
that all employees are now assumed to be contributing to a private
pension. Because we use a strong take-up assumption the estimates of the
maximum grant, and hence ceiling on contributions, which will keep the
scheme revenue-neutral are likely to be rather conservative.
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Table A6: Effect of three versions of a matching grant scheme for
different eligibility groups
Eligibility
for grant
No. of
households
eligible for
grant
(millions)
Max
grant
(£ pa)
Max pension
contribution
under
Version A:
50p per £
(£ pa)
Max pension
contribution
under
Version B:
66p per £
(£ pa)
Max pension
contribution
under
Version C: £
for £
(£ pa)
Everyone 22.8 228 456 342 228
Employees,
carers and
unemployed
16.4 333 666 499 333
Employees
only
13.8 420 840 630 420
Source: text and POLIMOD
As can be seen, the maximum amount of state support under a
matching grant scheme is considerably lower than under a tax-credit
scheme, and as eligibility to the grant is widened its value falls. This
reflects our constraint of revenue-neutrality and our assumption of
complete take-up: more people means each gets a smaller share of the cake.
The variation in the maximum pension contribution between the three
variants reflects the rate of match, so that, for instance, to get maximum
benefit from the available grant under a 50p per £ system someone would
have to contribute to twice the level of the grant.
The distributional effects of the scheme are illustrated in Figure A1.
The figure shows the proportional gains in household income (or, because
the money is paid into a pension fund, household wealth) from a revenue-
neutral matching grant on the eligibility bases outlined above. As the level
of matching grant remains the same in all three variants of the scheme the
distributional consequences are also unchanged. However, the assumption
of full take-up will become progressively less likely as the matching
schemes become less generous: people will probably be more willing to
forego £228 of current consumption for a £ for £ matching grant than they
would be to forego £456 for a 50p per £ matching grant. In any event, the
assumption of full take-up is unlikely to be correct for people in the bottom
deciles under any variant of the scheme, and consequently the gain from
the scheme for the poorest households is likely to be somewhat overstated.
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Figure A1: Distributional effects of a matching 
grant scheme
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